tell their stories, nor even merely in Freud's way of changing the essential questions that those narrative complaints addressed, but in Freud's unprecedented transformation of narration into theory. In transforming, thus, not just the questions of the story but the very status of the narrative, in investing the idiosyncrasies of narrative with the generalizing power of a theoretical validity, Freud had a way of telling stories-of telling stories about others and of telling others stories about himself-which made history.
My dear Wilhelm,
My self-analysis is the most important thing I have in hand, and promises to be of the greatest value to me, when it is finished....
If the analysis goes on as I expect, I shall write it all out systematically and lay the results before you. So far I have found nothing completely new, but all the complication to which I am used.... Only one idea of general value has occurred to me. I have found love of the mother and jealousy of the father in my own case too, and now believe it to be a general phenomenon of early childhood....
If that is the case, the gripping power of Oedipus Rex ... becomes intelligible. The Greek myth seizes on a compulsion which everyone recognizes because he has felt traces of it in himself. Every member of the audience was once a budding Oedipus in phantasy, and this dream-fulfilment played out in reality causes everyone to recoil in horror, with the full measure of repression which separates his infantile from his present state.3 "Only one idea of general value has occurred to me. I have found love of the mother and jealousy of the father in my own case too." From the Letters to Fliess to The Interpretation of Dreams, what Freud is instituting is a radically new way of writing one's autobiography, by transforming personal narration into a pathbreaking theoretical discovery. In the constitution of the theory, however, the discovery that emerges out of the narration is itself referred back to a story which confirms it: the literary drama of the destiny of Oedipus, which, in becoming thus a reference narrative-the specimen story of psychoanalysis-, situates the validating moment at which the psychoanalytic story-telling turns and returns back upon itself, in the unprecedented, Freudian narrative-discursive space in which narration becomes theory. While Freud reads Sophocles's text in view of the consolidation-the confirmation-of his theory, Lacan re-reads the Greek text, after Freud, with an eye to its specific pertinence not to theory but to psychoanalytic practice. Freud, already, had compared the drama of the Oedipus to the process of a practical psychoanalysis ("The action of the play consists in nothing other than the process of revealing . . . a process that can be likened to the work of a psychoanalysis"). But while this comparison between the literary work and the work of the analysand leads Freud to the confirmation of his theory-a theory of wish, of wish-fulfilment and of primordial Oedipal desires (incestuous and patricidal), Lacan's different analytic emphasis on the relevance of Oedipus to the clinician's practice, is not so much on wish as on the role of speech-of language-in the play.
What Freud discovered in, or through, the Oedipus-the unconscious nature of desire-implies, in Lacan's view, a structural relation between language and desire: a desire that articulates itself, sub-stitutively, in a symbolic metomymic language which, thereby, is no longer recognizable by the subject.
It is always at the juncture of speech, at the level of its apparition, its emergence, ... that the manifestation of desire is produced. Desire emerges at the moment of its incarnation into speech-it is coincident with the emergence of symbolism.
(S-II, 273)
No wonder, then, that Oedipus Rex, dramatizing as it does the primal scene of desire, in effect takes place on the other scene of language. "The unconscious", says Lacan, "is the discourse of the other." Oedipus Rex could be viewed as nothing other than a spectacular dramatization, a calculated pedagogical demonstration, of this formula. For Oedipus' unconscious is quite literally embodied by the discourse of the Other-of the oracle.
Oedipus' unconscious is nothing other than this fundamental discourse whereby, long since, for all time, Oedipus' history is out there-written, and we know it, but Oedipus is ignorant of it, even as he is played out by it since the beginning. This goes way back-remember how the Oracle frightens his parents, and how he is consequently exposed, rejected. Everything takes place in function of the Oracle and of the fact that Oedipus is truly other than what he realizes as his history-he is the son of Laius and Jocasta, and he starts out his life ignorant of this fact. The whole pulsation of the drama of his destiny, from the beginning to the end, hinges on the veiling of this discourse, which is his reality without his knowing it.
(S-II, 245)6
The unconscious is this subject unknown to the self, misapprehended, The nature of the recognition is, however, somewhat differently conceived, in Freud's discussion of the Oedipus as validating psychoanalytic theory, and in Lacan's discussion of the Oedipus as illuminating psycho-analytic practice. In Freud's analysis, Oedipus recognizes his desire (incest, patricide) as (unwittingly) fulfilled, whereas Sophocles's reader recognizes in himself the same desire, as repressed. The recognition is thus constative, or cognitive. In Lacan's different emphasis, however, the psychoanalytic recognition is radically tied up with language, with the subject's analytic speech-act, and as such, its value is less cognitive than performative7: it is, itself, essentially a speech-act, whose symbolic action modifies the subject's history, rather than cerebrally observing or recording it, at last correctly.
To bring the subject to recognize and to name his desire, this is the nature of the efficacious action of analysis. But it is not a question of recognizing something that would have already been there-a given-ready to be captured. In naming it, the subject creates, gives rise to something new, makes something new present in the world. The analytical speech-act by which the subject recognizes, and performatively names, his desire and his history (insofar as the misapprehension of the one has in effect structured the other), has to be completed, consummated, by an ultimate analytic act of speech which Lacan calls "the assumption of one's history", that is, the ultimate acceptance-and endorsement-of one's destiny, the acknowledgment of responsibility for the discourse of the Other in oneself, but also the forgiving of this discourse. "Is it now that I am nothing that I am made to be a man?" What is it, then, which makes for Oedipus' humanity and strength at the very moment at which he is "finished", at the moment when, reduced to nothing, he embodies his forthcoming death? What is it that Oedipus, beyond the recognition of his destiny, here assumes, and which exemplifies "the end of his analysis"? He assumes the Other-in himself, he assumes his own relation to the discourse of the Other, "this subject beyond the subject" (S-II, 245); he assumes, in other words, his radical de-centerment from his own ego, from his own self-image (Oedipus the King) and his own (self-) consciousness. And it is this radical acceptance, and assumption, of his own self-expropriation that embodies, for Lacan, the ultimate meaning of Oedipus' analysis, as well as the profound Oedipal significance of analysis as such. This significance is historically consummated by Oedipus at the moment when he awaits-and indeed assumes-his death. But this is not just a coincidence: the assumption of one's death is inherent to the analytical assumption.
You will have to read Oedipus at Colonus. You will see that the last word of man's relation to this discourse which he does not know is-death.
(S-II, 245)
Why death? Here Lacan is at his most hermetic, at his most elliptical. I believe, however, that this ellipsis embodies one of his most complex, profound and important psychoanalytic insights, and I will try-at my own risk-to shed some light on it by continuing, now, the analysis of Oedipus at Colonus "beyond" what Lacan explicitly articulates, by using some Lacanian highlights borrowed from other texts (other contexts). Let me first make an explanatory detour.
The Oedipus complex, in its traditional conception, encompasses two fantasized ("imaginary") visions of death: the father's death (imaginary murder), and the subject's own death in return (imaginary castration). The Oedipus complex is resolved through the child's identification with his father, constituting his superego; in Lacan's terms, the resolution takes place through the introjection of the Father's Name'0 (embodying the Law of incest prohibition), which becomes constitutive of the child's unconscious. As the first, archetypal linguistic symbol ("name") which represses, and replaces, or displaces, the desire for the mother, the father's name (and consequently, in the chain of linguistic or symbolic substitution, any word or symbol used metaphorically or metonymically, that is, all symbols and all words), in effect incorporates the child's assumption of his own death as a condition-and a metaphorfor his renunciation. Since symbolization is coincident with the constitution of the unconscious (the displacement of desire), "the last word of man's relation to this discourse which he does not know"-his unconscious-"is [thus] death": to symbolize is to incorporate death in language, in order to survive. What, now, happens in Oedipus at Colonus which is new with respect to the story (to the recognition story) of Oedipus the King (besides the subject's final death)?
Precisely the fact that Oedipus is born, through the assumption of his death (of his radical self-expropriation), into the life of his history. Oedipus at Colonus is about the transformation of Oedipus' story into history: it does not tell the drama, it is about the telling (and retelling) of the drama. It is, in other words, about the historization of Oedipus' destiny, through the symbolization-the transmutation into speech-of the Oedipal desire. Embodying the linguistic drama-the analytical speech-act-of Oedipus' assumption of his radical expropriation, Oedipus at Colonus tells, thus, not simply the story of the telling of the story of the Oedipus, the drama of symbolization and historization of the Oedipal desire, but beyond that ("beyond Oedipus"), as the final verses indicate, the story of the transmutation of Oedipus' death (in all senses of the word, literal and metaphoric) into the symbolic language of the myth. What is, then, psychoanalysis if not, precisely, a life-usage of the death-instinct-a practical, productive usage of the compulsion to repeat, through a replaying of the symbolic meaning of the death the subject has repeatedly experienced, and through a recognition and assumption of the meaning of this death (separation, loss) by the subject, as a symbolic means of his coming to terms not with death but, precisely, with his life?
The game is already played, the dice are already thrown, with this one exception, that we can take them once more in our hand, and throw them once again. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Beyond the Pleasure Principle was at first conceived by Freud as, precisely, a rethinking of his theory of dreams. This is born out by a paper Freud gave at the International Psychoanalytic Congress at The Hague (1920) under the title, "Supplements to the Theory of Dreams," and in which he announces his forthcoming publication. Here is how the paper's goal is summed up in the "author's abstract":
The speaker dealt with three points touching upon the theory of dreams. The first two ... were concerned with the thesis that dreams are wish-fulfilments and brought forward some necessary modifications of it ....
The speaker explained that, alongside the familiar wishful dreams and the anxiety dreams which could easily be included in the theory, there were grounds for recognizing the existence of a third category, to which he gave the name of "punishment dreams"....
Another class of dreams, however, seemed to the speaker to present a more serious exception to the rule that dreams are wish-fulfilments. These were the so-called "traumatic" dreams. They occur in patients suffering from accidents, but they also occur during psychoanalyses of neurotics and bring back to them forgotten traumas of childhood. In connection with the problem offitting these dreams into the theory of wish-fulfilment, the speaker referred to a work shortly to be published under the title, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle." The later text, however, in both Freud and Sophocles, is not a simple "supplement" or sequel to the early work, but its problema-tization. Both later works address the riddle generated by, precisely, the solution, the question constituted by the very answer. Both later works embody the enigma of an excess, a subversive residue, to (from within) the earlier solution: the enigma of the traumatic dream,11 in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, insofar as this compulsion to repeat manifested as death-instinct is not reducible to (goes beyond) wish-fulfilment; the enigma, in Oedipus at Colonus, of Oedipus' assumption of (the gift inherent in) his own death, of (the blessing incarnated in) his own radical self-expropriation, insofar as this enigma is not reducible to (goes beyond) Oedipus the King's ultimate self-recognition, amounting to the self-denial and the self-appropriation inherent, paradoxically enough, in the final gesture of self-blinding.
In The psychoanalytical establishment may have come to the conclusion that they no longer have "to wait to be enlightened," since they may believe they have, 
Lacan at Colonus
Thus, it is psychoanalysis itself, and not its object, which is now staked in the literary narrative, in the story of the Oedipus. When Freud maintains that sexual desire is at the heart of human desire, all his followers believe him, believe him so strongly that they persuade themselves that it's all so very simple, and that all there remains to do with it is science, the science of sexual desire. It would suffice to remove the obstacles, and it should work all by itself. It would suffice to tell the patient-you don't realize it, but the object is there. This is how, at first, the stake of interpretation is understood.
But the fact is, it doesn't work. At this point-the turning point-it is said that the subject resists. Why? Because Freud has said so. But one has not understood what it means to resist any more than one has understood the meaning of sexual desire. One believes one has to push. At this point, the analyst himself succumbs to a delusion. I have shown you what the insistance means on the part of the suffering subject. Now, the analyst is putting himself at the same level, In subscribing to Freud's psychoanalytic self-recognition in the Oedipus, as the moment of psychoanalysis' self-appropriation, its coming into the possession of its ("scientific") knowledge, and in censoring Beyond the Pleasure Principle as "non-scientific," the psychoanalytical establishment has, precisely, tried to censor, to repress this final Freudian self-expropriation, and this ominous narrative annunciation, by the "father of the psychoanalytic movement," of an inherent exile of psychoanalysis: an exile from the presence-to-itself of psychoanalytic truth; an exile from a non-mythical access to truth; an exile, that is, from any final rest in a knowledge guaranteed by the self-possessed kingdom of a theory, and the constrained departure from this kingdom into an uncertain psychoanalytic destiny of erring.
Counter this rejection of Freud's text, counter this repression, not just of Freud's insight, but of the very revolution involved in Freud's narration (in the unprecedented, self-trespassing, self-expropriating status of his narrative), Lacan has raised his training, psychoanalytic voice; but this protestation is, then, censored in its turn. Whatever the polemical pretexts, or the political reasons, given by the Censors, it is clear that the profound (and perhaps unconscious) thrust of the repressive gesture is the same: to eradicate from psychoanalysis the threat of its own self-expropriation (to repeat the Oedipal gesture of self-blinding); to censor, thus, in Freud as well as in Lacan, the radically self-critical, and self-transgressive, movement of the psychoanalytic discourse; to pretend, or truly to believe, that this self-transgression and this self-expropriation, far from being the essential, revolutionary feature of the psychoanalytic discourse, is (nothing other than) a historic accident, one particular historic chapter, to be (easily) erased, eliminated.
However, the repeated psychoanalytic censorships illustrate only the effectiveness (the working truth) of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (or of Sophocles'/Lacan's Oedipus at Colonus): in dramatizing the compulsion to repeat in the very midst of the psychoanalytic institution, they bear witness to the very Freudian story, illustrate the very Freudian myth of (something like) a death-instinct of psychoanalysis itself: the (Oedipal) repetition of a curse in a discourse that is destined to bestow speech as a blessing.
Through his call for "a return to Freud"-a return to ColonusLacan himself embodies, in the history of the psychoanalytic movement, a return of the repressed. This is why, like Oedipus at Colonus, he too announces (and his entire style is but a symptom of this announcement) the return of a riddle. Freud's own terms of acknowledgement of his own myth are, indeed, enlightening:
The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work, we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly. The analytical experience,, says Lacan, has been involved, since its very origins, not simply with fiction, but with the "truthful" structural necessity of fiction, that is, with its symbolical non-arbitrariness (E 12, 17). Like the analytical experience, the psychoanalytic myth is constituted by "that very truthful fictitious structure" (E 449). Insofar as it is mediated by a myth, the Freudian theory is not a literal translation or reflection of reality, but its symptom, its metaphorical account. The myth is not pure fantasy, however, but a narrative symbolic logic that accounts for a very real mode offunctioning, a very real structure of relations. The myth is not reality; but neither is it what it is commonly (mis-)understood to be-a simple opposite of reality. Between reality and the psychoanalytic myth, the relation is not one of opposition, but one of (analytic) dialogue: the myth comes to grips with something in reality that it does not fully apprehend, comprehend, or master, but to which it gives an The psychoanalytic experience has discovered in man the imperative of the Word as the law that has formed him in its image. It manipulates the poetic function of language to give to his desire its symbolic mediation. May that experience enable you to understand at last that it is in the gift of speech that all the reality of its effects resides; for it is by way of this gift that all reality has come to man and it is by his continued act that he maintains it.
If the domain defined by this gift of speech [says Lacan to an audience of psychoanalysts] is to be sufficient for your action as also for your knowledge, it will also be sufficient for your devotion.
(E 322, N 106)
Lacan's involvement with the Freudian myth (viewed as the literary gift of speech accomplished by Freud's discourse, through the dimension of narration and of narrative in psychoanalytic theory) is, thus, radically involved with the difference Freud is introducing into the conception and the practice of narration, a psychoanalytic difference that Lacan himself is replicating, in his own way, in his own theoretical and mythical gift of speech. Lacan's own involve-ment with the psychoanalytic difference in narration has three aspects: 1) Lacan's narration (both the story that he tells and his narrative voice, or style) is very different from the usual psychoanalytical narration of Freud's accomplishment and theory; 2) Lacan's narration is about [not identity, ego psychology, but the psychoanalytic myth as the story of the introduction of a] Difference; 3) The psychoanalytical narration, in Lacan's conception (modeled as it is on analytic dialogue), is always, necessarily, different from itself. In the very way it is narrated, the psychoanalytic theory inscribes (is constituted by) a radical self-difference. And this self-difference, this Spaltung in (within) the theory, this unavoidable breach of theory, is embodied by the myth, is the myth. The myth is thus at once the Other of the theory and that which gives the theory to itself, that which, from within the literary gift of speech, founds the theory. And while there is no possible cognition of the myth-no constative exhaustion of the myth by theory-, there should be a performative acknowledgement ("recognition" and "assumption") by the theory of its relation to the myth, and of the irreducibility of the myth, as something in the theory which, paradoxically enough, both expropriates it from its truth, and at the same time founds it as "a fictitious truthful structure." The myth is structurally truthful, and psychoanalytically effective, valid, not just in function of, but in proportion to, its capacity for narrative expropriation.
And this is why, precisely, Freud has privileged the Oedipus above all other myths. In dramatizing language as the scene (the acting out) of the unconscious (in both its clinical and its literary implications), the Oedipus is achetypal of the psychoanalytic myth in that it is the story of the narrative expropriation of the story by itself, the story of, precisely, the acknowledgement of the misrecognition of the story by itself. Misleadingly, the Oedipus appears, at first, to be the myth of a possession (of a kingdom, of a woman, of the solution to a riddle, of one's own story). But as it turns out, the Oedipus is not the myth of the possession of a story, but the myth, precisely, of the dispossession by the story-the dispossession of the possessor of the story. Any kingdom or possession coming out of the psychoanalytic riddle-solving is, in fact, incestuous, and, as such, is bound to bring about a Plague. Psychoanalysis can only be a gift of speech from the exile of Colonus.
As a narrative of this discovery, as a narrative, that is, not just of a discovery but of the discovery of difference, the story of the Oedipus exemplifies the psychoanalytic myth in that it exemplifies the problematic status of psychoanalysis telling its own story of discovery and, while telling, acting out its own unconscious, that is, doing something through the telling that the telling fails to account for, and thus discovering and re-discovering the difference between what it's telling and what it's doing in the telling, as the scene of its own dismantling by the literary myth and of its own theoretical self-subversion. The Oedipus is privileged, thus, as a myth, notjust because it is about the creation of the myth ("Oedipus himself is nothing other than the passage of this myth into existence"), but because it is, specifically, about the subversively performative aspect of this mythical creation. The story of the Oedipus is archetypal of the psychoanalytic myth in that it dramatizes speech not as cognitive but as (self-subversively) performative, in that it embodies this performative self-difference of (within) its own narration, this practical discrepancy, forever re-emerging, between its narrative or mythic statement and its narrative or mythical performance.
How, indeed, could speech exhaust the meaning of speech, .. . except in the act that engenders it? Thus Goethe's reversal of its presence at the origins of things, "In the beginning was the act," finds itself reversed in its turn: it was certainly the speech-act that was in the beginning, and we live in its creation, but it is the action of our mind that continues this creation by constantly renewing it. And we can only turn back on that action by allowing ourselves to continue to be driven by it even further. I know only too well that this will be my own case, too, in trying now to turn back upon the act of speech.
(E 271, N 61, TM)
Beyond Colonus: Truth and Science, or What Remains to be Narrated If Freud's psychoanalysis is, then, a symbolical reply to a reality it tries to come to grips with; and if this symbolical reply is made of myth-of radical myth which, in Lacan's conception, is absolutely irreducible from psychoanalytic theory-, it is to the extent that, in its function as a gift of speech, the psychoanalytic myth embodies, and derives from, a residue of action in the very process of cognition of that action. In another sense, this is equally what Freud has talked about, in his reference to his theory of the instincts as "his mythology":
Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, but we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly.
(XXII, 95)
Myth is something which we cannot be sure we are seeing clearly, but with which we work, because it works. Myth is thus a mediation between action and cognition, between theory and practice, a narrative negociation of difference and self-difference in the very practice of a discourse which purports to be cognitive and theoretical. As we have seen in the Oedipus, myth is, first and foremost, practically efficacious, both clinically and literarily. And it is, perhaps, because it thus combines the performative power In following Freud's mythical and scientific path, Lacan's interrogation, as opposed to Freud's, concerns, here again, not the theory but the practice. Can the practice of psychoanalysis have a scientific claim? Does the practice work (and if so, how?), out of a reference to a truth which is of the order of a science, which can be accountable by science? Lacan replies in the affirmative. But his answer is, as usual, paradoxical and challenging in the way it (analytically) displaces our expectation as to what a science is, and where the science of psychoanalysis would reside. If science is involved, suggests Lacan, in the practice of psychoanalysis, it is not because the analyst is scientific, but because the patient is, or can be. But the patient is not, as we would expect, the object of the science of psychoanalysis, but its subject. The (scientific) question of psychoanalysis thus becomes the question of the subject of a science.
To pose that the subject on whom we operate in psychoanalysis can be nothing other than the subject of science, may seem like a paradox.
(E 859) Any operation in the field of analytic action is anterior to the constitution of knowledge, which does not preclude the fact that in operating in this field, we have constituted knowledge.... For this reason, the more we know, the greater the risks we run. Everything that you are taught in a form more or less pre-digested in the so-called institutes of psychoanalysis (sadistic, anal stages, etc.,)-is of course very useful, especially for non-analysts. It would be stupid for a psychoanalyst systematically to neglect it, but he should know that this is not the dimension in which he operates.
( Paradoxically enough, it is precisely insofar as it embodies its own forgetting that the Oedipus myth is constitutive of the science of psychoanalysis. And this science only takes itself complacently (non-problematically) to be a science when it in effect forgets the fictive, generative moment of its birth, when it forgets, in other words, that it owes its creativity-the production of its knowledgeto a myth. In this respect, psychoanalysis, which treats the Real by means of the symbolic, is not so different, moreover, from any other science (physics, for example). There is a fictive moment at the genesis of every science, a generative fiction (a hypothesis) at the foundation of every theory. To borrow a metaphor from physics, one could say that the generative, fictive psychoanalytic myth is to the science of psychoanalysis what the Heisenberg principle is to contemporary physics: the element of mythic narrative is something like an uncertainty principle of psychoanalytic theory. It does not conflict with sci-ence-it generates it-as long as it is not believed to be, erroneously, a certainty principle.
The question of science in psychoanalysis is, thus, for Lacan, not a question of cognition but a question of commitment. And the concomitant acknowledgement of the psychoanalytic myth is, on the other hand, not a question of complacency in myth, but a question of exigency in and beyond the myth.
Science is the drive to go beyond. The scientist's commitment is at once to acknowledge myth and to attempt to go beyond the myth. Only when this (mythical, narrative) movement of 'going beyond' stops, does science stop. Only when the myth is not acknowledged, is believed to be a science, does the myth prevail at the expense of science. It is precisely when we believe we are beyond the myth that we are (indulge in) fiction. There is no 'beyond' to myth-science is always, in one way or another, a new (generative) myth.
There is no beyond to the narrative movement of the myth. But the narrative movement of the myth is precisely that which always takes us-if we dare go with it-beyond itself.
"Many complain", writes Kafka14, "that the words of the wise are always merely parables and of no use in daily life, which is the only life we have":
When the sage says, "go beyond," he does not mean that we should cross to some actual place, which we could do anyhow if the labor were worth it; he means some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us, something too that he cannot designate more precisely, and therefore, cannot help us here in the very least. All these parables really set out to say merely that the incomprehensible is incomprehensible, and we know that already. But the cares we have to struggle with every day: that is a different matter.
Concerning this a man once said: Why such reluctance? If you only followed the parables you yourselves would become parables and with that rid of all your daily cares.
Another said: I bet that is also a parable. The first said: You have won.
